'Extreme Pornography'

The UK government has recently moved to criminalize both production and consumption of porn that it deems "grossly offensive and disgusting." Clause 63 of the new Criminal Justice Bill defines this kind of porn as containing "real or pretend" acts which: (1) threaten a person's life; (2) may result in serious injury to the breasts, anus and genitals; (3) involve sexual interference with a human corpse; and (4) contain a person performing intercourse or oral sex on an animal. The law will effectively ban most ‘violent’ pornographic depictions, as well as images and stories featuring necrophilia and bestiality.

Is this law an intrusive policing of sexuality that will end up criminalizing most adult-consensual BDSM online communities? Or will it help to reduce violent sexual crimes, as the government claims?

If we accept the constructivist contention that sexuality is constituted by social discourses, it would appear that the UK government might have a point. Our sexual “natures” are not the expression of some internal, bio-psychological state, but are instead effects of cultural production. Thus, removing a key source of words and images that construct violent sexual desires will reduce the incidence of those desires. Presumably, if sexual violence is not craved, then it is much less likely to be implemented non-consensually. Banning ‘extreme pornography’ will reduce the amount of rapes, murders, kidnappings and tortures that are of a sexual nature.

Although this perspective appears to make intuitive sense, it represents a highly flawed and immature understanding of social constructivism. First of all, banning violent porn is not going to eliminate violent sexual desires. Violence is so much a part of our art, cultures, religions, history and daily life that eliminating the sources by which violent sexualities are constructed would require a censorship program of Stalinist proportions. Millions of paintings, movies, history books, works of fiction, holy texts, government policies etc… would have to be eliminated in order for this ‘purge of violent material’ to be truly successful. Eliminating violent sexual desires is as impossible as eliminating all instances or depictions of violence that might inspire those desires.

Furthermore, what is so bad about violent sexuality if it is practiced in an adult-consensual context? It is certainly a much more ethical alternative to violence as it is usually committed. What is more immoral? Torture and humiliation at the hands of Saddam Hussein’s henchmen, U.S. authorities at Abu Ghraib and Nazi ‘scientific’ experimenters? Or the same kinds of activities in an adult consensual framework, in which there are codes of conduct (such as ‘safe words’) that can ensure safety and security for all practitioners? Most violence is committed on a non-consensual basis, and it is that violence that is most morally questionable. Pleasure through consensual violence can be unproblematic if there are sufficient safeguards for the health of all concerned.

Thus, if the government were truly interested in providing some kind of regulation for ‘extreme pornography’, it would do well to pass laws that bind producers and consumers of such porn to accept an adult-consensual and safe framework of activity. For instance, requiring porn producers and users to sign statements about the necessity of adult-consensual safeguards in violent sexual situations would be a major step forward. Another useful policy is mandating that violent porn websites have to feature at least one page that lists guidelines for safe and healthy BDSM. If the government is actually concerned about people who want to practice violent sexuality, then it should enforce these kinds of regulations. The government should also avoid passing measures that would inhibit BDSM parlors (which usually have very well developed standards of collective safety and rule-enforcement) from practicing. In the 1990s, “decency laws” in many Western countries forced BDSM establishments to shut down or disperse to isolated parts of town. Thus, violent sexual cultures lost major institutions that encouraged adult-consensual and safe behavior.

Another issue that practitioners of violent sexuality should be aware of is the implications of structural violence in society. Women, racial and sexual minorities are frequently the subjects of systematic violence. Eroticizing sadism against these particular groups is, thus, highly problematic: sexist, racist, homophobic and ableist discourses can perpetrate sexuality, as they can any other social practice. I am certainly not advocating for a ‘ban’ on BDSM practices that reflect patterns of social dominance. Rather, it is simply necessary for the participants in such practices to be aware of the social implications of their actions. There is a risk that social oppressions reproduced in sexuality can feed back and reinforce dominance in the wider social realm. Practitioners of violent sexuality should at least be aware of this risk.

Overall, the UK government’s move to ban ‘extreme porn’ is a mistake. It is not going to contribute to a reduction in violent sexual crimes. If the government is truly interested in regulating ‘violent sexual practices’ (and ensuring the safety of its citizens), it should use ‘extreme porn’ websites to spread awareness about adult-consensual and safe BDSM practices.

***For More Information***
The Wikipedia page on ‘extreme porn’ has a surprisingly good summary of the concept as well as an insightful analysis of the debate around it. Also, check out the following articles: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/magazine/7364475.stm
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article1527806.ece
In addition, take a look at this very interesting ‘diagram’ of various kinks and fetishes: http://www.trevoroldak.com/uploads/fetishmapbig.gif
For a useful analysis of how ‘decency laws’ have forced the closure of BDSM establishments that encouraged safer sex, adult-consensual practices and ‘healthy play’, check out Michael Warner’s excellent book, The Trouble With Normal. I have also dealt with a similar topic in a previous post.

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The Joy of Social Construction

Why do we harp on ad nauseam about things being ‘socially constructed’? Why is ‘social construction’ so essential to gender and sexuality studies? The answer to these two questions lies in the activist and progressive effects that constructivist thinking can produce. Asserting that something is socially constructed means that it is changeable. It is created out of human interaction and can eventually be undone. This is opposed to an essentialist world view, which does not question the origins of social phenomena, but takes them as bio-psychological givens. Essentialist formulas for change usually occur within established power structures, while social constructivists perceive those power structures as open to change.

For instance, some scholars have lauded the modern Muslim practice of veiling as feminist because it can free women from the scopophilic gaze of men. By ‘covering themselves up’ women will not allow men to judge them based solely on restrictive beauty standards. They will not have to visually prostitute their bodies in order to get jobs, relationships or marriages. This policy is the result of an essentialist view of men and masculinity. Men are taken ‘as they are’ (superficial scopophiles) and women must adjust to that in order to make life better for themselves.

Social constructivists would resist this kind of framing of gender. Men may judge women based on standards of ‘physical beauty’, but there is nothing necessarily permanent about this. Men are collectively ‘like that’ because society makes them that way. It encourages them to behave in ways that are degrading to women. Popular culture, parents, the media and schools all promote a ‘beauty’-based valorization of women; boys are taught that being a ‘real man’ implies this kind of attitude to the so-called ‘opposite’ sex. Therefore, under a social constructivist framework, patriarchal behaviors are the product of identifiable ‘social doings’ that we can work towards changing. Instead of ‘covering up’ women as a response to male scopophilia, we can change masculinity by altering the structures of socialization that produce it. The media does not have to promote degrading judgments of women, parents can teach their kids to not judge people based on their gender, and schools can encourage gender equality. Under a constructivist framework, there is no reason for thinking that patriarchal social phenomena are permanent: we can all work collectively towards changing them. It is no wonder, therefore, that feminists and other gender progressives depend so much on social constructivist thought. It is generally an optimistic worldview that winks at the possibility of change in society.

But is there such a thing as social constructivist thought? Does this concept not make sense only when defined against essentialism? This is true, to an extent. There are many diverse theories that deal with ‘constructed-ness’ and not all of them are necessarily in fundamental agreement with each another. One of the most basic fault lines within social constructivism is between ‘symbolic interactionism’ and poststructuralism. The former is considered more ‘mainstream’ and generally follows the schema outlined above. The latter is a more pessimistic, and at times, anti-progressive theory that has come up against some resistance in modern academia.

Both symbolic interactionists and poststructuralists conceive of identities as ‘socially constructed’, but differ on the desirability of ‘stable’ identity constructions. Poststructuralists deny the existence of a knowledgeable human nature that precedes socialization and view rigid identity performances as reflective of a lack of stable identity. People stick doggedly to fixed identities because they are afraid of the ‘instability and uncertainty inside’. In turn, the need to maintain a stable identity causes violence towards others because the only way that it can be maintained is through an ‘othering’ process that discredits and despises anything that which the desired identity is not. For example, fixed heterosexuality is inevitably violent because it requires a level of disgust at all other sexual identity options as a way of maintaining itself. Thus, poststructuralists favor embracing the fluidity and ambiguity of identity as the only way that social change can be achieved. In order for patriarchy to ‘go away’ both men and women are going to have to take their identities a lot less seriously. Symbolic interactionists, on the other hand, find nothing wrong with stable identities as long as they are better identities. Masculinity does not have to be destabilized in order to stop being aggressive. Rather, it is possible to change the identity for the better (expunging homophobia & misogyny from it), while maintaining its fixity.

***For More Information***
For a basic introduction to a symbolic interactionist framing of gender, have a look at Candace West and Don Zimmerman’s “Doing Gender” from the first issue of Gender and Society (1987). Since this article may be hard to find on the Internet, you can use this summary to get at their argument. West and Zimmerman examine gender from the perspective of individuals reacting to social expectations, but if you are looking for a more institutionalist perspective, check out Judith Lorber’s “Night to His Day”.

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Fussy Old Foucault

Sometimes, it seems impossible to have a healthy relationship with the work of Michel Foucault. In academia, worshipful adoration mixes with utter derision to produce a frustrating bifurcation: fawning love for the seminal philosopher or absolute disdain for the fussy French sophist. At the heart of this polarization is Foucault’s conceptualization of ‘power’. Unlike many philosophers (and the vast majority of political theorists), he does not theorize power as something that an individual or institution actually has. For Foucault, power is not the ability to make others do what they otherwise would not have done. It is not limited to the accumulation of material and social capital that individuals and other entities can use to cajole others. Rather, Foucault views power as a productive force that is constitutive of people’s identities. Power is a particular discourse that creates the person, simultaneously liberating and imprisoning her. It constructs who we are and sets the conditions under which we can operate in the world.

For instance, a woman who gets plastic surgery in order to look more ‘beautiful’ may think that she is empowering herself. And, in a sense, she is. By tailoring her body according to the perceived exigencies of heterosexual men, she is more likely to get jobs and be sought for marriage. She is acquiring the social resources that have the potential to incite others to do what they otherwise may not have done. Nevertheless, she does not choose the terms on which she acquires this power. She is the product of gendered social discourses that force her to perceive ‘normative beauty’ as her only ticket to success. She is produced as a gendered subject by these discourses, and thus, it is the discourses that have the power – not her. They can exercise this power because they are ultimately productive: they produce an identity for the person (in this case, ‘woman’) and a ready-made blueprint for how to ‘get on’ in life based on this identity (‘beauty’, pleasing men). But, at the same time, they fundamentally limit her. She is a slave to the discourses that constitute her identity: she is not her own person. This is why power is so effective. It provides tangible benefits for those who succumb to it, while, at the same time, profoundly entrapping them. Power gives its subjects the illusion of control over their lives, while defining the very essence of their being.

There are generally two sets of objections to this kind of analysis. People who perceive themselves as beneficiaries of the status quo find it particularly disturbing because the terms of their success are exposed as not being their own. On the other hand, those who fight against the status quo find it maddening that Foucault does not seem to view anything as truly emancipatory. Their proposed revisions of the status quo have the potential to be just as oppressive and limiting. There is always ‘something’ (power) lurking in the background, constituting, constraining and limiting everything that we are and everything that we do. The discursive power behind any new identities that we create for ourselves is bound to enchain us in some way. People, thus, write Foucault off as a hopeless non-conformist, a radical revolutionary for whom the world will never be radical enough. A Foucauldian analysis (such as the one below) of the oppressive implications of the gay rights movement often comes under particularly strong criticism.

In Foucauldian terms, the modern gay rights movement is a direct product of the post-Enlightenment medicalization of homosexuality. Sexuality was transformed from something one does to something that one is for the purpose of classifying homosexuality as a psychiatric disease. Modern LGBT identity politics owes its existence to this transformation. Without it, it would be impossible to make appeals to human rights for people who are homosexuals. And while this new discourse, which produces sexuality as an identity rather than an action, has definitely contributed to ‘liberating’ some people, it has also placed them in a new spider’s web of limitations. The classification of people into homosexuals or heterosexuals creates restrictive identities that limit the polymorphous potential for sexuality. The medicalization of homosexuality has, ironically, provided the key resources for liberationist homosexual politics, while locking people in a new set of chains: those of binary, fixed, stable and consistent sexuality that somehow forms of the essence of their being. Critics of Foucault complain that this attitude is far too pessimistic and disrespectful to the successes of the liberationist gay movement.

This objection is perfectly understandable. What is the point of political engagement if it is just going to lock us into another set of discursive chains? Is any political effort not going to end up imprisoning people in some way? For a healthy engagement with Foucault, we should take this part of his philosophy with a grain of salt. Rather than automatically assuming that whatever ‘new social arrangement’ emerges must be oppressive in some way, it would be more productive to be on the lookout for potential anti-emancipatory effects of all political activity (no matter how emancipatory it claims to be). Foucault’s caution with emancipatory politics should be taken as a warning about utopias. He demonstrates the foolishness of the notion that, at some point, all oppressive politics will stop and we will all live happily ever after. For a healthy engagement with Foucault, we should understand his doubts about ‘emancipatory politics’ as a warning against illusory utopias, not as a definitive statement that defines all political efforts.


***For More Information***
Foucault’s The History of Sexuality (Vol. 1) is a great read and provides an interesting starting point for exploring his reconceptualization of ‘power’. Power/Knowledge, collection of essays and interviews, is also very useful. Also, check out my previous post on Foucault and fetishism here.

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Understanding Bug-Chasing & Gift-Giving

Most writing about bug-chasing and gift-giving is dominated by sensationalism or absolute condemnation. This previous post by lewdandshrewd is an example of the latter. Although the need to condemn bug-chasing is understandable (especially in the cases when gift-givers are passing HIV to unsuspecting non-bug-chasers), we lack a deeper understanding of the phenomenon. Why do some people get a thrill out of getting HIV (or other STDs) and giving it to others? What kinds of gender and sexuality dynamics are at work in gift-giving and bug-chasing? Also, given that it is such a minority phenomenon, why are we so obsessed with it?

The sociological and anthropological literature on the subject has identified bug-chasing/gift-giving subcultures as ‘carnivalesque’ spaces in which social roles are thoroughly reversed and forbidden or impossible relationships are given free play. This is an analogy to Medieval Carnivals, which featured stunning role reversals, such as pictures of women beating their husbands, pigs slicing up butchers and serfs lording over their masters. Similarly, the bug-chasing/gift-giving subculture reverses the social discourse on HIV – everything about the illness is turned upside down and previously impossible social arrangements are imagined. For instance, as a potentially fatal illness, HIV is associated with death. However, the discourse of gift-giving reconceptualizes HIV as productive by allowing Poz men to ‘give birth’ to new Poz offspring. It also subverts social norms about the body: the healthy and fit body is no longer seen as socially desirable. Bodies that show visible signs of illness (such as lesions) are seen as particularly sexually attractive in the bug-chasing/gift-giving groups. Overall, the subculture seems to invert all practical reason and revel in threatening social order.

But is this the reason why people want to become bug-chasers and gift-givers? Oddly enough, even though we may perceive the subculture as particularly subversive and non-conformist, people get involved in it for somewhat ‘conservative’ reasons. The literature identifies the revival of masculinism in gay male communities as one of the reasons that people engage in risky and dangerous sexual practices (such as barebacking). Safer sex practices are perceived as effeminate and ‘unsexy’ ways of controlling men’s sexualities. ‘Real men’ should approximate the ‘Marlboro Man’ image, never shrinking from danger and sometimes actively seeking it out! Thus, gift-giving and bug-chasing are in some cases attempts to revive a thrill/danger-seeking sexuality that fulfills norms of masculinity. Others have cited an interest in belonging to some kind of ‘community’ or ‘brotherhood’ by finally attaining HIV status. In this case, bug-chasing and gift-giving is a method of forming social bonds. By getting the ‘gift’ of HIV, people are initiated into essentially a new culture, with new privileges and responsibilities. Finally, there are also men who perceive becoming HIV Positive as a ‘relief’. Gripped with fear about becoming HIV-Positive, they perceive actually getting the virus to be the only way of overcoming that fear.

Overall, we view bug-chasing and gift-giving as profoundly subversive activities. And yet, the sociological literature suggests that people get involved in them for fairly conservative reasons (masculinism, forming social bonds), or because their fear of getting HIV is too intense and they would rather ‘get it over with’ by catching the illness. Given that bug-chasing and gift-giving are minority phenomena, why is it that both straight/normative and LGBT popular cultures are so obsessed with it? It has been found that about 14% of gay men engage in barebacking, and a very small amount of those are bug-chasers or gift-givers. They are, essentially, a minority within a minority – why all the attention, then? First, there’s definitely an element of right-wing propaganda against LGBT people. In a 'Human Sexuality' class taught at my old university by a very conservative Professor, she handed out an article on bug-chasing during our discussion on gay marriage, claiming that it was ‘relevant subject matter’. What sexual fetishes about HIV and STDs have to do with same-sex marriage is beyond me. She was clearly trying to show that queer people are immoral and not deserving of anybody’s sympathy. For those not trying to spread the conservative message, bug-chasing appeals as a topic because it has the macabre sensationalism that sells magazines and newspapers. It is simply one of those ‘out-there’ topics that is bound to get anyone’s attention.

***For More Information***
I found the following article very useful: Michael Graydon’s “Don’t Bother To Wrap It,” from the journal, Culture, Health and Sexuality (Vol. 9.3). David Moskowitz’s “The Existence of a Bug-Chasing Subculture,” from the same journal (Vol. 9.4), is also quite good. Otherwise, there are quite a few more sociological/anthropological articles out there. Just search for ‘bug-chasing’ on Google Scholar (scholar.google.com) and you will find plenty of information!

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Eastern Gays, Western Gaze

When discussing the status of queer people in countries that form part of the so-called East, Global South or Third World, it is easy to fall prey to an Orientalist discourse of hopelessness with regard to LGBTQ issues; from the violent breakup of gay pride parades in Russia, to the banning of same-sex hugging in Zimbabwe and mob violence in Jamaica, the lives of queer people in non-Western countries seem extremely difficult and fraught with violent discrimination. Further still, Western news reporting on this subject, both inside and outside the LGBT community, reflects broader tensions and inequalities in the global relationship between East and West.

Edward Said introduced the concept of ‘Orientalism’ as a framework for analyzing the bases of Western knowledge about the East. He argued that whatever Westerners ‘know’ about the East is not the product of actual knowledge about Eastern societies, derived from ‘objective’ responses to sense impressions received from interaction with the Middle East, Africa, South America and Asia. Rather, it is the outcome of elaborate ‘Orientalist’ discourses, which limit the context in which knowledge about the East is acquired and presents the Western ‘observer’ with a ready-made blueprint of information about the non-Western world.

‘Orientalism’ is the cultural discourse through which the East is either imagined (for those that have never been there) or perceived (for those that have visited). In this discourse, all non-Western societies are constructed as fundamentally the same: they are basically the ‘opposite’ of the West. For instance, while Europe and the U.S. are imagined to be the realm of technology, progress, and liberalism, the East is always already constructed as that part of the world where traditionalism/conservatism, nature and ‘barbaric’ values still reign. An alternative Orientalist discourse involves portraying the West as ‘progressive, but boring and bland,’ while the East (with its barbarisms and quirks) is depicted as vivacious, exotic and ‘interesting’.

Given the above, how has representation of queer troubles in the East/South/Third World been held hostage by Orientalism? There has been an overwhelming tendency to focus on solely the negative aspects, or to write about queer life in the non-Western world only in the context of oppression. This ignores the fact that, despite awful discrimination, queer life goes on and numerous queer communities do emerge even in places in which one would least expect them to. The overwhelming focus on the discriminatory context of queer life in the East contributes to Orientalist discourses about the ‘backwardness’ and traditionalism of the non-Western world and obscures the fact that queer peoples and communities do find ways of managing life, even in very oppressive circumstances. Further, the actions of individuals and organizations working to resolve the problem become obscured – the sole focus is on the egregious human rights abuses (which make for sensational, eye-catching news) – and not the more mundane aspects of everyday LGBT activism and struggle.

Aside from continuing the emphasis on the savagery and barbarity of the East, there is also a tendency to ‘idealize’ the East as ‘exotic’ and sexually mysterious: a place that has been less subject to the regulative Western labeling of gender and sexuality. Indeed, in her book Queer in Russia, Laurie Essig posits Russia as a place where it is possible to actually live a truly ‘queer’ existence, outside the restrictive categories that many have built their lives around in the West. Although this version of Orientalism puts a considerably more positive spin on the ‘East’, it is ultimately discriminatory and inaccurate as well. By eroticizing and exoticizing the East, the authors writing under this framework again ignore the everyday inequalities that LGBT people in that area of the world have to deal with. While the discourse of ‘Eastern barbarism’ places too much emphasis on discrimination and inequality (so much so that it makes non-Western societies appear barbaric), the discourse of ‘Eastern exoticism’ totally ignores it.

On the whole, we have a representational conundrum – what is the solution? Perhaps it is time to let people from the global South/Third World/East speak for themselves. Since being represented by the West is fraught with ideological and political difficulties, perhaps the best thing that Western LGBT and human rights organizations can do is provide a forum for people from the East to speak. Rather than attempt to see them from the perspective of the West, it might be necessary to let them represent themselves on their own terms. And if this is not possible, then Westerners need to be aware of Orientalist discourses and to dedicate themselves to steering away from them in future writings.

***For More Information***
Definitely check out Edward Said’s Orientalism. It’s a classic read and provides a great framework for analyzing West/East and North/South international relations. Maria Todorova’s Imagining the Balkans is also useful. Although it has a more regional focus (on Southeastern Europe), she does provide a similar framework to Said’s which is just as valuable.

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A Theory of Chris Crocker

Internet celebrity, Chris Crocker, burst into our lives in late 2007 with a shrill youtube clip, which tearfully admonished people to “Leave Britney Alone!” However, the potentially irritating nature of that clip was not the main cause of the abuse that Crocker subsequently received. A cursory look at the comments under his clips reveals thousands of sexist and homophobic statements, such as “faggot has no life, retard,” “he’s stupid and he looks half like a girl,” “cock slap that little fag,” “if it’s a dude, stop trying to be a girl!” As if that’s not enough, he regularly receives death threats and ill treatment in his hometown (reportedly a small, rural place in the Southern U.S).

As I have argued in many of my previous posts, homophobic abuse is based mostly on perceived gender performance, not sexuality. Thus, the fact that Crocker claims to be gay is not what truly motivates the abuse (although he mentions his sexuality frequently in other videos, there was no explicit indication of it in “Leave Britney Alone”). It is his femme gender performance and “cross-dressing” which really disturbs people. Crocker’s case highlights the need for the transgender and gay/lesbian/bisexual communities to work together, as they are both essentially fighting against the same injustice: gender normativity, and the expectation that being assigned a gender category implies staying firmly within that category and acting in a particular way. Who one has sex with is just another gender issue, another expectation that rigid male-masculinity and female-femininity impose – not a reason to campaign separately.

Activist concerns aside, what is most disappointing about the “Leave Britney Alone” uproar is that it overshadows Chris Crocker’s other clips, in which he provides interesting, funny and sometimes controversial commentaries on gender, sexuality and other social issues. In this post, I will provide an introduction to those clips, as well as a theoretical analysis of his general approach:

For example, in the clip below Crocker takes a perspective on normativity that is similar to that of queer theory:

Although being ‘normal’ is often defined as ‘conforming or adhering to a norm,’ it is also associated with the notion of sanity, and being free from mental illness. Thus, Chris Crocker highlights for us how the persecution of the non-normative is embedded and confirmed in language. In a subsequent clip, he humorously questions the existence of heterosexuality (and by definition, all ‘definitively rigid’ sexuality labels):

He also addresses discrimination within gay communities, severely criticizing people who complain about ‘flamers,’ ‘sissies’ and ‘queens’:


Overall, from watching the above clips, one attains the sense that Chris Crocker takes a generally queer theoretical perspective in his approach to gender and sexuality issues. He highlights for us the existence of strong gender-performance bias within the gay community, questions the actual possibility of definitive sexual labels (such as, ‘heterosexual’), and critiques societal definitions of ‘the normal’. Nevertheless, the story of Chris Crocker’s theoretical leanings is considerably more complex. A look at some of his other videos reveals an unfortunate adherence to a primitive gay essentialism, which has considerable misogynist overtones. He seems to embrace the kind of conception of gay sexuality that defines itself in opposition to women’s bodies. For instance, in the video “Why I’m Gay…” his sexuality is conceptualized as having been “there from birth.” However, he attributes his sexual orientation not to genetic innateness, but to the traumatic experience of having to smell his mother’s vagina during birth:

Although we cannot take what he saying totally seriously, it is not uncommon for gay men to occasionally define their sexualities against a disgust for putatively female body parts, thus exhibiting a kind of ‘gay misogyny’. He continues this trend in the following video:

Then, he takes the disgust with vaginas to its logical conclusion, arguing that gay guys actually have it harder in society than women, that PMS and giving birth are not all that difficult, and that women need to stop complaining that life is so hard on them. Thus, he engages in a ‘competition of oppressions,’ claiming that life is, in general more of a challenge for gay men:


Overall, Chris Crocker is a fascinating theoretical phenomenon. On the one hand, he appears strongly anti-essentialist, blurring the lines between gay and transgender identities, bitching the gay community out for its disrespect towards ‘queens and flamers,’ and questioning the definition of “the normative” in society. On the other hand, his attitude to women is a disappointment. He is prepared to reduce his sexuality to being, essentially, an expression of disgust with vaginas. Thus, he invokes the discourse of ‘gay misogyny,’ which is basically another crudely essentialist way of conceiving gay sexuality. Although it is often brought up in a joking contest, ‘gay misogyny’ (defining one’s sexuality in disgusted opposition to women’s bodies) is widespread enough to be taken seriously as a problem, and may be one of the reasons behind strains in social relationships between gay men and women.

***For More Information***
Check out all of Chris Crocker’s videos here, as well as his MySpace page. The phenomenon of ‘gay misogyny’ is not very well documented in the theoretical literature on gender and sexuality, so if anybody is aware of any articles or books that discuss it, please let us know! There are many good general books on queer theory, but I would particularly recommend Annamarie Jagose’s Queer Theory: An Introduction.

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Do We Need A Fourth Wave?

The history of feminism in the West is a familiar one. And yet, despite many complaints about the current lack of organized direction in feminism, there is little or no discussion about where feminism should proceed next, no vision of what a ‘Fourth Wave’ should look like. Perhaps this is because of feminism’s diverse reach: since it is now an ideology, a social movement, and an academic discipline, it may be more and more difficult to come up with a new, unified direction. Indeed, when feminists were a small minority, organized in tight-knit groups, and rallying against a proudly patriarchal society, finding a common approach must have been considerably easier than in the current conditions of institutional and organizational dispersion. My contention, however, is that feminism has failed to engender “a Fourth Wave” for ideological reasons: feminists have not yet come to grips with the legacy of the Third Wave, which questioned many of its taken-for-granted assumptions shook the ideology to its core. Indeed, if we take seriously the contributions of the Third Wave, then the very need for more ‘waves’ and definitive directions is placed seriously into doubt.

The main contribution of the Third Wave was to question feminists’ claims about representation. Second Wave feminists claimed to speak for all women, to represent the interests of all women. And yet, ‘woman’ is a diverse and unstable category – do the claims of the white, middle-class, heterosexual feminists living in the West (who dominated the Second Wave) necessarily apply to all women? Certainly not. For example, a classic feminist claim for much of the 20th Century has been that the patriarchal family is the primary locus of women’s oppression: the authority exercised by male “heads,” and the domestic labor that only women are expected to do, have fatally undermined women’s autonomy and have placed them in a subordinate position. Black feminists challenged this claim: in the face of a racist society, in which Black women could not expect to exercise autonomy or authority, the “household” was actually a place where they had considerable freedom. Black women were usually the main breadwinners, and for them, families served as a source of strength against structural racist oppression, a locus where they could exercise authority. Thus, the White feminist critique of the family/household does not apply unproblematically to Black women. Furthermore, Second Wave feminists have focused almost exclusively on altering and reforming Western state structures – they have portrayed (necessary) policy changes, such as free state-sponsored child-care and equal pay as essential ‘women’s’ demands. And yet, how can this resonate with Third World women? Their needs may well include other issues, such as reduction of infant mortality, access to clean water and access to education. Moreover, the fact that they live in a different kind of cultural context may require a more flexible feminism, with some fundamentally different core assumptions.

Overall, the Third Wave resisted the homogenizing and universalizing tendencies of feminism and criticized the notion that men and women are always already constituted as subjects. After the 1980s and 1990s, claims to speak for ‘all women’ are no longer so easily accepted and more care is taken to specifically address the needs of women of color, lesbian women, disabled women, Third World women, transgender women and working-class women. It is no longer possible to portray the demands of Western, middle-class, White and heterosexual women, as the essential expression of women’s needs and interests. And this is where the confusion comes in. If feminism needs to be so radically diverse, if it needs to adjust itself and question its core assumptions every time that a different subject position is invoked, then how can it maintain internal unity? How can it claim to be a unified perspective? Indeed, this intellectual dispersion of feminism has disturbed many of the ideology-discipline’s practitioners, with feminists such as MacKinnon, calling for a return to an “unmodified” feminism, united in its approach and centralized in its direction.

What kind of form would such a united and centralized feminism take? How would it be possible to avoid the racist, ethnocentric, heteronormative and classist biases of Second Wave feminism, whilst maintaining a central direction? Few scholars and activists have provided effective answers to these questions, although there has been much clamoring about them. One possible alternative for a “new direction” in feminism is Mohanty’s argument that feminism must “begin from and be anchored in the place of the most marginalized communities of women – poor women of all colors in affluent and neo-colonial nations; women of the Third World/South” (Mohanty 2003). She believes that this kind of anchor would provide the most inclusive paradigm for thinking about social justice and would focus feminists towards areas where they are most needed.

On the other hand, some have criticized the very need for “a definitive new paradigm” in feminism as not being exactly congruent with the lessons of Third Wave feminism. As Judith Butler points out in Undoing Gender, attempts to create a reified feminism with a firm direction may in fact be succumbing to oppressive, phallocentric tendencies. Third Wave feminism taught us about the difficulty of making blanket statements and about the value of democracy within a movement. Would it be possible for the feminist movement to actually be strengthened by a commitment to diversity within it, by an emphasis on dialogue and difference, rather than a programmatic adherence to a particular direction? Why does feminism even need to be centralized and united? This is the key question for feminists and the answer to it is likely to have a major impact on the future of the movement.

***For More Information***
There are many books that provide excellent overviews of the history of feminism. I would particularly recommend Bonnie Smith’s Global Feminisms Since 1945. For critiques of racism and ethnocentrism, definitely check out anything by bell hooks or Angela Davis, as well as Levine and Campbell’s Ethnocentrism: theories of conflict, ethnic attitudes and group behaviour. For works about the future ‘direction’ of feminism, have a look at Mohanty’s article “Under Western Eyes” from Signs (issue 28, Volume 2), Judith Butler’s Undoing Gender, as well as Catherine MacKinnon’s Feminism Unmodified.

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Ugly People Are Also Stupid?!

This post is a response to the article, “To those that have, shall be given” from the December 22nd, 2007 issue of The Economist. You can find the article here. I would like to encourage everybody to write to the Economist about this issue (e-mail - Letters@economist.com) or post something in the comment box below.

The (unnamed) author of the above article makes the following argument: ‘The ugly are one of the few groups against whom it is still legal to discriminate’ –however, there are good reasons to be prejudiced against them: various scientific studies have shown that there are links between how ‘symmetric’ someone is and their intelligence. People are, therefore, correct to assume that someone they consider ‘beautiful’ is also smart, intelligent and capable – much more so than someone they consider ugly. So, in choosing a partner or a person for a job one should really favor the so-called ‘better-looking’ candidates. There are some very serious issues with this argument. The author’s naïve and unproblematic use of the term “beauty,” her/his insensitivity to ethical issues, and the callous acceptance of scientific evidence all reek of eugenics and dangerous biological determinism.

Does the author of this article not realize that the category “beautiful” is not something absolute and definite: it cannot simply be based on simplistic and vacuous criteria like ‘good symmetry’? It is a label that confers privilege, but it is also a label that is largely limited to the privileged. Beauty is a category that is raced, gendered, classed, and usually confined to those that are temporarily-able-bodied. This is not to say that people of diverse races, genders, classes, shapes and abilities cannot be valued as beautiful (from time to time) in dominant discourse, but that the very definition of beauty can play a major role in patterns of discrimination. For example, in India (as in many other parts of the world) being beautiful is often defined as being light-skinned – thus, ‘beauty,’ in this case, is based around race and is a racist construct. Beauty is also dependent on ‘appropriate’ gender performance. Although high fashion has, on occasion, pushed the boundaries of the feminine and the masculine, it has largely ignored trans people and women that are just ‘too masculine’ and men that are ‘too feminine’. Trans people and other gender ‘misfits’ are routinely portrayed as ugly caricatures in popular culture – the category of ‘beauty’ is unavailable to them inside dominant discourse. The same goes for the disabled: people in wheelchairs, amputees, or those with conditions like spina bifida probably do not meet the ‘symmetry’ requirements of this Economist article or the less specific ‘beauty exigencies’ of dominant discourse.

Furthermore, the article under discussion fails to acknowledge the gendered nature of beauty: the extreme pressure on women to be beautiful (in a narrow, socially acceptable way), and its systematic effects, such as the silent, creeping dominance of eating disorders. The saddest thing is that women are all too frequently judged based on their beauty and are encouraged to judge themselves by these same criteria. Men are also judged for their beauty, but not as intensely. They have a considerably broader and easier range of behaviors, grooming, and ways of dressing that constitute ‘male beauty.’ For a lot of women, beauty is a complicated full-time occupation, practically a second job – makeup, clothes, hairdos, dieting, ‘corrective’ surgeries etc… Few women are taught that they are beautiful as they are – instead, they are told that they must work hard everyday to become beautiful, that this beauty is their major bargaining chip vis-à-vis the world (i.e. – getting jobs, husbands), and that staying beautiful should be their most important task. Being thin, having the ‘right’ skin tone, wearing the appropriate clothes and makeup, having ‘pleasant features’ - all of this requires work, time and money that some people who do not belong to the upper or middle classes simply may not have. The resources spent on trying to attain this unattainable ‘beauty goal’ fuel a beauty industry that rakes in hundreds of billions of dollars a year, and beauty-obsessions keep women in a subordinate position success-wise: all of the time they have spent beautifying, applying, extracting, removing, shopping, dressing, washing, brushing could have been used for career advancement, spending time with family and friends, or other activities.

And for what? For a ‘beauty ideal’ that masquerades itself as essential, timeless and an absolute necessity, but in fact, is none of these things! Take a peek in other cultures or take a glance back through history, and anyone can see that beauty is relative. Men used to wear lots of makeup in 18th Century Europe. Larger of fuller-bodied women are considered the pinnacle of beauty in some African countries and were highly valued by European Renaissance painters. The beauty standards that people are held to nowadays are not definitive in any way – they are a time-bound, historically-influenced construct and they do not deserve the absolute reverence that popular culture and magazines tend to bestow on them.

Overall, I have tried to show in this post that ‘beauty’ is not something absolute that exists plainly for everyone to see – but that it is a category of privilege that can often be racist, sexist, ableist, upper-class/Western, and limited to people of a particular size and shape. Therefore, the author of the article under discussion – by approving discrimination against those considered “not-so-beautiful” – has also tacitly approved the entire list of prejudices that I have outlined above. In addition to not being able to extricate itself from an oppressive context, beauty is also strikingly relative – what may pass for sexy and handsome in one day and age, may not in another. Does this not mean, then, that we should encourage people to be less obsessed with beauty? And that justifying discrimination against people who are not considered beautiful is a very unjust thing?


***For More Information***
There are several classic feminist texts that deal with the beauty issue. Naomi Wolf’s The Beauty Myth examines the economic effects that the socially imposed obsession with beauty can have on women. Germaine Greer’s The Whole Woman also addresses similar issues: she discusses how relative beauty standards across are time and culture. For a powerful account of a fat person’s attempts to deal with beauty myths and standards, see Frances Kuffel’s Passing For Thin and her website. I am as yet unaware of any discussions of beauty from a queer theory perspective, but if you know of any, please write to us in the comment box below! For a fascinating disabled person’s account of how he dealt with a beauty-obsessed gay male culture, check out Body, Remember by Kenny Fries. The anthology Queer Crips: Disabled Gay Men’s Stories (Guter and Killacky, Eds.) is also worth a look.

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Challenging Transsexuality?

"Without gender differentiation... There would be no need to reconstruct genitalia to match identity - interests and life-styles [would] not [be] gendered."
– Judith Lorber

The above quotation by sociologist Judith Lorber is an example of the so-called gender-progressive challenge to transsexuality (understood as a process of surgical changes to the body that would transform one’s sex or gender identity). The standard argument goes something like this: Transsexuals are victims of society’s oppressive gender diktat. They mutilate their bodies because gender norms require having ‘the right’ genitalia in order to be a ‘real’ man or a ‘real’ woman. Wearing dresses and high-heels is contingent on having a vagina and breasts; facial hair and tuxedos are only for those with penises and a flat chest. And as good gender-progressives, we all know that these norms are a sham, and that many people with vaginas do ‘masculine’ things and many people with penises do ‘feminine’ things. We are aware of the terror and discrimination faced by these gender non-conformists, and thus, we are tempted to explain away transsexuality as a relic of gender oppression: transsexuals are forced to change their bodies because that is the only way they can construct a socially acceptable gender. They would be subject to shame, prejudice and violence if they did not change their bodies to conform fully to the gender prerogatives they want to enact. Thus, in a world without a tyrannical, binary gender ideology, transsexuality would cease to exist.

This line of reasoning, however, rests on several incorrect assumptions. First of all, it takes for granted that anybody who decides to change genitalia must be enacting a male-to-female or female-to-male transition. Is it not possible for agender, queer or genderqueer people to want to change their bodies – not in order to conform to a pre-existing sex/gender blueprint or for medical reasons – but simply because they ‘want to,’ because they think they would ‘look better,’ or be closer to ‘being themselves’? What if someone decides to remove breasts, but keep a vagina? Or add breasts, but keep a penis? Clearly such a person would still be a ‘transsexual’ (defined as one who undergoes surgical changes one’s sex organs), but definitely not the kind of transsexual imagined by the ‘critique-of-transsexuality’ discourse, described above. By ignoring the fact that transsexuals do not necessarily have to be MTFs or FTMs, this discourse makes invisible the very queer existences that it claims to stand for. Clearly, transsexuality does not only occur in a ‘traditional’ gender context, and thus, it would not ‘cease to exist’ in a queer or gender-progressive world.

Furthermore, it is also imperative to question the uneasiness with which the ‘progressive’ critique of transsexuality views ‘typical’ sex/gender changes. It assumes a kind of pathology (albeit socially imposed) for people who obtain vaginas and breasts in order to be women and people who acquire a penis and remove breasts in order to be men. The pressure of gender norms is undeniable, and it is clear that some people would not change their genitalia if it were not for social pressure. However, these are not grounds for dismissing the experiences of trans people as holdovers of an oppressive binary-gender model. ‘Queer utopia’ is not even close to being achieved. Worldwide, most people claim to belong to a binary gender system and cannot yet be expected to see beyond that. Indeed, it is questionable whether we can ever truly escape the binary gender system, and thus, trans people’s attempts to fit into it should be respected. Genderqueer communities do exist (as described above), however, they are small and isolated, not within reach of most people, or anywhere close to having a presence in mainstream social discourse. Queer utopia is far away, and thus, transsexuals should not be chastised for ‘failing’ to rely on its ‘eventual arrival.’ As Judith Butler states, “…trouble is inevitable, and the task, how best to make it, what best way to be in it.” This quotation sums up the predicament for many transgender people today, and having a ‘traditional’ sex change is a common solution.

In addition, the ‘progressive’ critique of transsexuality treats changing one’s genitalia as an ultimate act of social conformity. As most trans people will tell you, however, it is anything but that! Not having the genitalia one was born with (the so-called ‘natural’ ones) is viewed with painful amounts of stigma and violence. Transsexuality is an attempt to be oneself against immense social odds. It is true that this image of ‘selfhood’ is constructed by social gender expectations. Nevertheless, this does not make it any less respectable and any less remarkable of a triumph.

To sum up, the so-called gender-progressive critique of transsexuality misses the point on two fronts. First, it assumes that transsexuality can happen only in a binary-gender context – which is dispelled by the fact that genderqueer people can and do change their ‘sexual’ organs. Second, by figuring ‘traditional’ transsexuals as bearers of the effects of gender oppression, the queer critique of transsexuality denigrates their experiences. Yes, changing one’s genitals ‘appropriately’ may often be an attempt to ‘fit in’ to gender norms, but, in a deeply trans-phobic world, this is often a feat of immense bravery and social non-conformity. Binary gender is not going to go away anytime soon, and the attempts of transsexuals to ‘fit in’ to it against the odds should not be scorned.

***For More Information***
Judith Lorber is a well-known sociologist of gender. She teaches at Brooklyn College (City University of New York). Although she is not an out-and-out advocate of the ‘progressive critique of transsexuality’ discourse, her work covers a broad range of debates on gender and is certainly worth a look. Paradoxes of Gender and The Social Construction of Gender are especially worthwhile. You can find her essay, “Night to His Day: The Social Construction of Gender” here.

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"Sticks and Stones..."

“...can break my bones, but words will never hurt me.” So goes the famous, yet highly erroneous saying. This piece of “common sense” fundamentally misrepresents the power of language, its power to construct the world around us, to a priori determine what is possible and impossible, what is permitted and what is proscribed. Words have a constitutive effect: they create “reality” as much as they describe it.

A basic example of this is the gendered use of pronouns. Before the 1970s, using the masculine signifier (“he”) as the designator for any person performing an activity was ubiquitous. For instance: “a wise politician is never impatient, he always waits for an opportunity.” This default use of the masculine pronoun by default placed women in a passive position – they were excluded from becoming public figures (politicians, religious leaders, businesspeople etc...). Language did not create this problem, but it served to embed patriarchal norms and to continually (re)make them through repeat performance. Language is itself very difficult to change – it is such an indispensable part of everyday life that the values it represents often go unquestioned, and thus, have a way of seeping into people’s minds. Indeed, it would not be an exaggeration to say that, aside from a few notable exceptions, people have a “fish in water” attitude to language. This is one of the reasons why it was so hard to question why only he was allowed to vote, hold property etc... Patriarchy took up nearly all the space that language provided.

Nowadays, at least in English, it is more common to use gendered pronouns in combination: “She or he,” “He/She,” “S/he” – this is a conscious response to the sexism described above. However, this still has exclusionary effects. By solely conferring recognition on two genders – masculine-male, feminine-female – genderqueer and intersex people are practically wiped out of existence. Their invisibility, and their fundamental “impossibility,” is a priori determined by the linguistic gender-structure that people are held hostage by. This makes it almost impossible to imagine a person who actually identifies as something other than male-masculine or female-feminine. Of course, people do imagine androgynes, “trans” people, and hermaphrodites, however, these are never taken seriously as identities or ways of being in this world. They are usually used as fodder for cheap comedy or conceived as strange quirks of otherwise definitively male or female people.

My basic point in this post is that language matters and that any progressive gender and sex/ual/ity politics should be considerate of language issues. A cavalier attitude to language, such as the one expressed in the following quotation, should not be encouraged: “I used to say fag, gay, retard all the time, then I stopped – I wanted to be taken seriously by liberals. I recently changed my mind, though. These words roll off the tongue and everybody knows that they mean what you want them to mean. I’m supportive of gay people, but sometimes I want to say ‘I’m being so gay’.” The essential mistake in this statement is the assumption that words mean what one wants them to mean. Although it is possible to have personal meanings to words, or even to make up words that only mean something to oneself (gagableebleegugu made sense to me when I was a kid), words have social meanings that almost always overpower their personal meanings. Thus, although the person who said the above statement may claim that the meaning of the word “gay” has changed for hir, that ze “wants it to mean” something different, ze will use it in a social context in which its meaning has already been decided and firmly embedded, in which the people listening to hir will think ze is using it the “normal” way. There are currently two meanings to the word gay (homosexual and silly/stupid/bad). The use of the phrase, “that’s so gay” associates with both of these, and in a social setting, will always be gay bashing, no matter what the speaker intends. Thus, words’ social meanings tend to overwhelm whatever personal significations we impute to them. Activists should be aware of these social meanings and should seek to change them when they are oppressive.

A striking example of the way that words’ social signification can overpower their personal meaning can be found in the work of Sigmund Freud. He often referred to “deviant” sexualities as “perversions.” What he meant by “perversion,” however, is not something negative or unacceptable – he personally defined it as anything that deviates from a strict biological necessity. Thus, in Freud’s personal framework, most sex/uality is perverse, dining for pleasure is perverse, going down slides is perverse – nearly everything we do is perverse. Nevertheless, the social meaning of “perversion” is a profoundly negative one. It connotes sickness, willful breaking of social norms, evil desires etc... Thus, Freud’s use of the word, “perversion,” has provided ammunition for some conservative “ex-gay” groups who have tried to show that homosexuality is a kind of illness. They have used the work of Freud and other psychiatrists as the basis for their “diagnosis” of homosexuality-as-illness. The social meaning of the words that Freud used (not what he actually meant by them) provided them with that opportunity.


***For More Information***
Definitely check out Freud’s Three Essays on Sexuality – particularly interesting is the “battle” that goes on between “Freud-the-radical-social-constructionist” and “Freud-the-science-obsessed-19th-Century-Psychiatrist.” Although he has a very lengthy chapter on “the perversions,” in which he talks about various “deviant” sexualities (fetishism, homophilia, sadomasochism), notice how he subtly suggests that all strictly non-reproductive sexual activities (even kissing, caressing, massaging) are perversions. Truly an important assertion!

For more on the power of language, have a look at any poststructuralist thinkers, in particular Jacques Derrida (Of Grammatology, Writing and Difference) and Judith Butler (see previous posts). For a simpler, clearer, and angrier introduction to these issues, check out Riki Wilchins’ Read My Lips: Sexual Subversion and the End of Gender, and Queer Theory, Gender Theory: An Instant Primer.

If you’re looking for an introduction to genderqueer and intersex issues, Wilchins’ Genderqueer: Voices from Beyond the Sexual Binary is the perfect place to start.

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Against The Nation?

As far as I am aware, most queer and gender-progressive activism occurs within the context of a nation-state. With the exception of some groups, such as the International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA), feminist and queer activists usually lead lonely campaigns within a single country. It is thus necessary to ask what effect nation-states (particularly ones that are “ethnically-defined”) have on these movements. How does ethnic nationalism (a powerful ideology that seeks to advance the perceived interests of a particular ethnie) impact gender and sexuality? How does it affect the work of activists seeking to alter dominant patriarchal and homophobic/heterosexist norms?

The principal theorist of the links between nationalism, gender and sexuality is Nira Yuval-Davis. The “big names” in social science thought about nationalism, such as Hobsbawm and Anderson, generally ignore the gendered dimensions of this phenomenon. Yuval-Davis fills this gap in the academic discourse by emphasizing the gender ideologies that proliferate in nationalist thought and action. In Racialized Boundaries, she outlines how a desire to control reproduction is inherent in ethnic nationalism. Membership in an ethnic group is almost exclusively based on being born into it – having the “right” ethnic blood. Reproduction is vital in this case as it ensures the future survival of the ethnie and the replication of its physical and cultural content.

Much of ethnic culture, therefore, is organized around rules relating to sexuality, marriage and the family, and since nationalism does not just create a common past for ethnic community – but also a common future – maintaining an appropriate level of reproduction (whether through anti-natalist, eugenicist or pronatalist policies) is conceived as paramount to the ethnie’s long-term survival. These ideas are echoed by Verdery (1994: 207): “‘nation’ parallels ‘gender’ in linking the physical ‘body’ of the state to a set of meanings and affects, thus rendering physical space socio-political… the standard rhetoric of nation-states effectively ties together control over the subject bodies and over territory.” Similarly, Gal and Kligman (2000: 23) point out that, at least in the case of Eastern Europe, citizens are constantly compelled to present a legally approved, reproductive” sexuality, because the “very concept of nationhood relies crucially on reproductive discourses and practices to make and remake the ‘nation’ and its boundaries.” Indeed, the deep, inextricable connection between nation, gender and sexuality is perhaps best exemplified by the etymology of the word “nation”: it comes from the Latin word, “natus,” which means, “to be born.”

Overall, nation-states, particularly those that are heavily influenced by ethnic nationalism, have an inherent desire to control sexuality and to demand a certain “proper level” of reproduction (which is dependent on the maintenance of patriarchal gender norms). Ethnic nationalism, thus, is very likely to be unfavorable to queer advancement and gender-progressive politics, as it would endanger the imperative of gender and sexual control that is inherent to it. How should activists respond to this challenge, then? Should they actively work “against the nation,” seeking to abolish its validity and advocate a radical politics that would eventually see the state “wither away” (a la Marx)? Should they attempt to accommodate themselves to ethno-nationalist norms and requirements? Or should they perhaps attempt to change the meaning of “the nation,” to move the semantic framework away from discourses about control of gender and sexuality?

Of these suggested tactics, the “abolition of the state” perspective has considerable “radical appeal,” (indeed, states and the international state-system do promote various other injustices, such as war, conflict, economic exploitation etc…). However, it is unlikely to be practical given the fact that people overwhelmingly identify with the nation or state that they were assigned at birth – altering this identification could only be a very long-term goal. Attempting to accommodate to the patriarchal and gender-conservative norms of the ethnic nation-state would be an uncomfortable process, at best – as it would involve arguing that emancipated women and “sexually free” individuals somehow support the social control over gender and sexuality that nationalism mandates. That would, in fact, be impossible.

The idea of reconfiguring nationalism away from an ethnic basis certainly holds the most promise. Promoting a kind of “civic nationalism,” where the nation is identified more with fostering a diverse social order and human rights for all its citizens, rather than the survival of a particular ethnie, would be a promising tactic for gender-progressive and queer organizations seeking to improve the gender and sexual order within their nation-states. This has, in fact, happened in South Africa. Although racial and ethnic tensions are still ever-present, the post-1994 South African state has identified itself considerably with a discourse of human rights – the “nation-state” has been reconfigured as the primary promoter of these rights, rather than the power-vehicle of a particular ethnic group. This discursive alteration has enabled policies such as same-sex legal unions and has fostered the creation of vibrant queer communities in some of the larger towns. Thus, reconfiguring the basis for nationalism, rather than abolishing it, would seem to be the best tactic for dealing with queer and feminist politics within nation-states.



***For More Information***
Nira Yuval-Davis’ work is absolutely pivotal for this subject. If you would like a “short-and-sweet” summary of her main ideas, the article “Women and the Biological Reproduction of the Nation” (in Women’s Studies International Forum. Vol. 19. 1-2, pp. 17-24) is a good place to start. She has also written several fascinating and very accessible books with Flora Anthias, in particular Woman-Nation-State and Racialized Boundaries. For a full bibliography, take a look here.

Other important thinkers on this subject write mostly about particular regions. For example, Deniz Kandiyoti focuses primarily on gender, nationalism and sexuality in the Middle East – her classic text is Gendering the Middle East: Emerging Perspectives. I have mostly studied this subject in the context of Eastern Europe, for which the work of Susan Gal and Gail Kligman is indispensable: Reproducing Gender is the key text – a shorter and more readable alternative is The Politics of Gender After Socialism (2000). Kathryn Verdery’s work is also important – check out her article “From Parent-State to Family Patriarchs: Gender and Nation in Contemporary Eastern Europe” (in East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 8.2, 1994).

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Gay Babies

The below poster of a baby, with the word “homosexual” written on its armband, is part of a proposed campaign by the left-wing administration of Tuscany (a regional government within Italy) to combat homophobia. It represents an attempt to teach people that, because homosexuality is not a choice, gays and lesbians should not have to face discrimination. This kind of “no-choice” approach is nothing new. Gay conservatives wholeheartedly adopted it (throughout the 1990s) and it effectively became the centerpiece of mainstream GLBT organizing in the United States. The “genetics-inspired” notion that one is homosexual or heterosexual at birth does not play a significant role in the theorizing of major conservatives, such as Bruce Bawer and Andrew Sullivan. However, they both expend considerable amounts of ink claiming that homosexuality is “essentially unchosen,” “innate and intrinsic,” and fixed by “at least the age of three”. Their purpose is the same as that embodied in the Tuscany administration’s poster above.
Is this essentialist vision of sexuality valid? Although sexuality is certainly not a simple choice (if we think of choice as switching a light-bulb on or off), the “no-choice” portrayal of it is definitely lacking. It ignores people whose sexualities change over time, bisexuals, and gender-queer sexualities that defy categorization within the homosexual-heterosexual binary. What, for example, would essentialists make of someone who is in a relationship with a transgender man who has a vagina? Is that “homosexual” or “heterosexual”? Furthermore, although people do not simply get up in the morning and decide to turn homo or heterosexual, what is wrong with choosing to be open-minded and experimental with one’s sexuality? Is this not a value that GLBT and queer organizations have a right, and even perhaps a responsibility, to promote? The “no-choice” version of sexuality essentially delegitimates sexual exploration and open-mindedness and works to reinforce the rigidity of homosexual and heterosexual identities, which – if you accept the Butlerian perspectives portrayed in my previous post – may actually increase tensions between straight people and the GLBT community.

The “no-choice” strategy represents an attempt by various elements within the GLBT community (and “well-meaning” left-liberal politicians) to afford homosexuality the same privileged discursive status as heterosexuality: as an unquestioned, bio-psychological given. As such, it is an easy example of how knowledge-power (as portrayed by Foucault) works. The dissemination of the “knowledge” that homosexuality is not a choice attempts to empower gays and lesbians by placing it on the same semantic level as heterosexuality. Unfortunately, under such a framework, the attainment of rights and fair treatment become dependent on the fixity of one’s sexual aim: all those who do not demonstrate such a “stable” sexuality are then implicitly excluded from the nexus of rights and privileges.

Despite all of the flaws mentioned above, can the “no-choice” strategy” be justified as politically expedient? Could it work as short-term tactic that will make the attainment of marriage rights and non-discrimination laws considerably easier? Indeed, U.S. public opinion agencies have documented a link between public support for gay rights proposals and the notion that homosexuality is not a choice. Belief that homosexuality is innate seems to be pivotal in inspiring most people’s support for anti-discrimination laws, such as ENDA. Although the passing of important legal measures may well be speeded by the promotion of such a discourse on homosexuality, it represents no guarantee that prejudice and discrimination will abate. Take the example of the physically and mentally disabled, who despite not having chosen their non-normativity, and having gained considerable legal battles, still face incredible levels of discrimination. Promoting the idea that sexuality is not a choice may facilitate the passing of certain laws – however, these laws in themselves are not going to end homophobia or sexism.

Basing an entire GLBT rights campaign or movement around the “no choice” strategy is, thus, a mistake. What would some alternative approaches to fighting homophobia look like? What other kinds of frameworks could be used to attack prejudice against non-heterosexual people? Homophobia could be portrayed simply as gender discrimination or sexism – indeed, the notion that a particular sexual aim is intrinsic to men and women is just the same as any other requirement in the sexist “life plan” that is drawn out at birth for each sex/gender. Another way of going about it would be to emphasize the inherent value of sexual autonomy in itself. The notion that human sexuality should be as free as possible (within adult-consensual constraints) may very well have its own appeal and is more inclusive of all sexual and gender identities. By promoting sexual autonomy in general (and not the rights of a particular identity-community), there is more of a chance that non-binary and unfixed sexualities will be adequately represented and subsequently legitimated. It is time to go beyond the “no choice” strategy, and the “gender discrimination” and “sexual autonomy” frameworks provide interesting road-maps for a new direction in GLBT activism.

***For More Information***
To find out more about the poster campaign in Tuscany, look here. I have taken a bit of a break from theory in this post – nevertheless, there are still some interesting works to check out. For further elaborations of the “no-choice” perspective, see Bruce Bawer’s A Place at the Table and Beyond Queer (edited by Bawer). Also, have a look at Andrew Sullivan’s various writings – the book Virtually Normal sums him up quite well. For a deeper look at the knowledge-power nexus and discourse theory, see Foucault’s Knowledge/Power: Selected Interviews and Other Writings. A strong case for sexual autonomy can be found in Michael Warner’s The Trouble With Normal.

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Sexual (In)difference

“I do not think that [sexual] exclusions are indifferent. Some would disagree with me on this and say: 'Look, some people are just indifferent. A heterosexual can have an indifferent relationship to homosexuality. It doesn't really matter what other people do. I haven't thought about it much, it neither turns me on nor turns me off. I'm just sexually neutral in that regard.' I don't believe that. I think that crafting a sexual position, or reciting a sexual position, always involves becoming haunted by what's excluded. And the more rigid the position, the greater the ghost, and the more threatening it is in some way.”

– Judith Butler.

The above quotation from pivotal feminist philosopher, Judith Butler, suggests that identity is fundamentally relational. Thus, identity labels – heterosexual, bisexual, American, Guatemalan, White, Black, gay, upper class etc… – do not exist without their opposite – an “other” identity that supposedly represents everything that the original identity is not and defines its boundaries. To take a non-gender/sexuality example, one of the main ways that Soviet identity was constructed during the Cold War was through the “othering” of the United States, which was portrayed as a nation full of criminals, capitalist exploiters, imperialists, and as a place where the working classes generally suffered a terrible fate. This representation of the U.S. situated Soviet communist identity and established its limits, giving it ideological meaning and justifying Soviet policies towards the other “superpower”.

Does this relational constitution of identity always imply at least some level of violence? Butler seems to think that it does. Indeed, aside from taking a major swipe at libertarianism (the ideology of indifference to social problems), she claims that any rigid identity label must be “haunted” by that “other” which defines it. Thus, any attempt to strictly define oneself in such a way will involve a (potentially violent) tension with that particular identity’s opposite. In this sense, relations between straights and queers are bound to be fraught with passive-aggressive tension and distrust (at best) and dangerous hostility (at worst).

This perspective has important implications for queer or GLBTQ activism. It suggests that there is no way to completely trust “straight people,” that no matter how outwardly supportive they are of GLBTQ rights, t